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In a principal-agent relationship, the primary challenge is aligning the agent's actions with the principal's objectives. This is especially difficult when direct oversight is limited. The principal can use incentives to encourage the agent to act in the principal's best interest.

Performance-based compensation is a common strategy for bringing goals into sync within organizations. For example, a senior manager might receive a fixed salary along with rewards for meeting specific metrics, such as revenue growth. This way, the manager is more likely to focus on what benefits the company.

Another example is commission-based compensation, which is typically seen in sales roles. For instance, a salesperson might receive a base salary along with a commission for each successful deal they close, with the commission being a percentage of the sale value. This structure motivates the salesperson to close more deals, leading to higher revenues for the company. This structure also links the company’s (principal) goals to those of the salesperson (agent).

The flexibility of incentive schemes allows them to address a range of challenges in principal-agent dynamics. By tying rewards to measurable achievements, such systems motivate agents to focus on results. These results not only help agents fulfill their roles but also support the organization's broader goals.

From Chapter 17:

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17.15 : Incentives in the Principal-Agent Relationship

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17.2 : Observable Quality

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17.7 : Mitigating Lemons Problem III: Truthful Quality Reporting

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17.8 : Adverse Selection When Buyers Have More Information: The Market for Insurance

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17.9 : Mitigating Adverse Selection in the Market for Insurance

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17.10 : Moral Hazard

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17.11 : Moral Hazard in the Market for Insurance

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17.12 : Moral Hazard in the Banking Sector

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17.13 : Mitigating Moral Hazard

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17.14 : Principal-Agent Relationships

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