The Lemons Market problem describes a scenario of asymmetric information, where the seller knows more about the product's quality than the buyer. In such markets, buyers struggle to distinguish between high-quality products termed ‘plums’ and low-quality products termed ‘lemons.’  As a result, buyers tend to undervalue all products, motivating many sellers of high-quality products to exit the market, removing most of the plums. However, mechanisms such as leasing programs can mitigate this issue by increasing the proportion of high-quality products in the market.

In a leasing program, vehicles are leased to lessees (buyers) for a specified term from the lessor. The lessor must ensure the product is high quality before the lease agreement. This is done through rigorous inspections, ensuring that only well-maintained, high-quality cars are introduced to the used car leasing market. Additionally, the lessor may provide warranties or service guarantees to assure lessees of the product's reliability and condition throughout the lease term. 

The introduction of this alternative market for consuming high-quality used cars shifts the market dynamics for consuming used cars. The assurance of quality makes buyers more confident in their purchases, alleviating their concerns about encountering lemons. This increased confidence allows buyers to pay closer to the actual value of the vehicles. By ensuring a steady influx of high-quality cars, leasing programs address the adverse selection problem inherent in the lemons dilemma.

Thus, mechanisms like leasing programs not only benefit buyers by offering reliable options but also incentivize sellers to participate in the market, ultimately enhancing the overall quality of goods traded.