JoVE Logo

Zaloguj się

17.11 : Moral Hazard in the Market for Insurance

A moral hazard occurs when a party in a transaction neglects their responsibilities because they know that the other party will bear the financial consequences. This arises due to information asymmetry, as one party cannot observe the behavior of the other party after the transaction has taken place. 

Moral hazard is a typical problem in the insurance market. Its potential consequences can be detrimental to the market.

For instance, consider a buyer who purchases a comprehensive health insurance policy. Before acquiring this policy, the buyer may have been more proactive about their health, exercising regularly, maintaining a balanced diet, and avoiding risky behaviors to keep healthcare costs low.

However, after making the decision to purchase the health insurance policy, the buyer might become less cautious about their health habits. For example, they might start skipping regular medical check-ups or become less strict about their diet, knowing that any medical treatments needed as a result of their lax behavior will be covered by the insurance company. This decision, influenced by the insurance policy, is a clear example of moral hazard in action.

In this scenario, the insurance company cannot continuously monitor the buyer’s lifestyle choices and preventive health practices. This means that the change in the buyer's behavior could lead to more frequent and costly medical claims. As a result, these increased costs are passed on to all policyholders through higher premiums.

This dynamic illustrates how individual behavioral changes due to moral hazard can have broader consequences for the entire market, affecting affordability for all buyers.

Tagi

Moral HazardInsurance MarketInformation AsymmetryBuyer BehaviorHealth Insurance PolicyPreventable Health PracticesInsurance PremiumsBehavioral ChangeFinancial ConsequencesMarket Dynamics

Z rozdziału 17:

article

Now Playing

17.11 : Moral Hazard in the Market for Insurance

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

30 Wyświetleń

article

17.1 : Complete Information and Asymmetric Information: Meaning

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

53 Wyświetleń

article

17.2 : Observable Quality

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

27 Wyświetleń

article

17.3 : The Lemons Problem: Sellers Have More Information

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

25 Wyświetleń

article

17.4 : The Lemons Problem: Adverse Selection in the Market for Used Cars

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

42 Wyświetleń

article

17.5 : Mitigating Lemons Problem I: Reducing Asymmetric Information

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

25 Wyświetleń

article

17.6 : Mitigating Lemons Problem II: Increasing the Average Quality in the Market

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

22 Wyświetleń

article

17.7 : Mitigating Lemons Problem III: Truthful Quality Reporting

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

24 Wyświetleń

article

17.8 : Adverse Selection When Buyers Have More Information: The Market for Insurance

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

26 Wyświetleń

article

17.9 : Mitigating Adverse Selection in the Market for Insurance

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

17 Wyświetleń

article

17.10 : Moral Hazard

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

28 Wyświetleń

article

17.12 : Moral Hazard in the Banking Sector

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

36 Wyświetleń

article

17.13 : Mitigating Moral Hazard

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

20 Wyświetleń

article

17.14 : Principal-Agent Relationships

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

20 Wyświetleń

article

17.15 : Incentives in the Principal-Agent Relationship

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

19 Wyświetleń

JoVE Logo

Prywatność

Warunki Korzystania

Zasady

Badania

Edukacja

O JoVE

Copyright © 2025 MyJoVE Corporation. Wszelkie prawa zastrzeżone