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Complete information means all participants in a transaction know all relevant details. For example, in perfect competition, both buyers and sellers know about  the availability of alternative products, product prices, the number of competitors, and the quality of the products. However, in real markets, the participants usually have different levels of information, which leads to  a market environment of asymmetric information.

Asymmetric information occurs when one party in a market transaction has more information than the other. This imbalance can affect decision-making and cause market inefficiencies.

An Example of Asymmetric Situation

A classic example of asymmetric information is found in the used car market. Sellers generally have more comprehensive knowledge about the vehicle’s condition than potential buyers. Sellers know that car owners may hide undesirable information  about the car’s accident history, and repair quality. Knowing this, used car buyers are only willing to offer lower prices for all used cars, including those cars that are of high quality. This means all used car owners will receive lower prices for their cars regardless of quality.

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17.1 : Complete Information and Asymmetric Information: Meaning

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

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17.2 : Observable Quality

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

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17.3 : The Lemons Problem: Sellers Have More Information

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

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17.4 : The Lemons Problem: Adverse Selection in the Market for Used Cars

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

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17.5 : Mitigating Lemons Problem I: Reducing Asymmetric Information

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

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17.6 : Mitigating Lemons Problem II: Increasing the Average Quality in the Market

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

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17.7 : Mitigating Lemons Problem III: Truthful Quality Reporting

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

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17.8 : Adverse Selection When Buyers Have More Information: The Market for Insurance

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

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17.9 : Mitigating Adverse Selection in the Market for Insurance

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

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17.10 : Moral Hazard

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

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17.11 : Moral Hazard in the Market for Insurance

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

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17.12 : Moral Hazard in the Banking Sector

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

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17.13 : Mitigating Moral Hazard

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

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17.14 : Principal-Agent Relationships

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

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17.15 : Incentives in the Principal-Agent Relationship

Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

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