A Protocol of Manual Tests to Measure Sensation and Pain in Humans

Numerous qualitative and quantitative techniques can be used to test sensory nerves and pain in both research and clinical settings. The current study ...

Duquesne University

Metaphors are a fundamental aspect of human cognition. The major neuropsychological hypothesis that metaphoric processing relies primarily on the right hemisphere is not confirmed consistently. We propose ways to advance our understanding of the neuropsychology of metaphor that go beyond simple laterality. Neuropsychological studies need to more carefully control confounding lexical and sentential factors, and consider the role of different parts of speech as they are extended metaphorically. They need to incorporate recent theoretical frameworks such as the career of metaphor theory, and address factors such as novelty. We also advocate the use of new methods such as voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping, which permits precise and formal tests of hypotheses correlating behavior with lesions sites. Finally, we outline a plausible model for the neural basis of metaphor. (JINS, 2009, 16, 1-5.).

Beyond laterality: a critical assessment of research on the neural basis of metaphor.

Prepositions combine with nouns flexibly when describing concrete locative relations (e.g. at/on/in the school) but are rigidly prescribed when paired with abstract concepts (e.g. at risk; on Wednesday; in trouble). In the former case they do linguistic work based on their discrete semantic qualities, and in the latter they appear to serve a primarily grammatical function. We used the abstract concept of time as a test case to see if specific grammatically prescribed prepositions retain semantic content. Using ambiguous questions designed to interrogate one's meaningful representation of temporal relations, we found that the semantics of prescribed prepositions modulate how we think about time. Although prescribed preposition use is unlikely to be based on a core representational organization shared between space and time, results demonstrate that the semantics of particular locative prepositions do constrain how we think about paired temporal concepts.

Prescribed spatial prepositions influence how we think about time.

Distinguishing between a fair and unfair tackle in soccer can be difficult. For referees, choosing to call a foul often requires a decision despite some level of ambiguity. We were interested in whether a well documented perceptual-motor bias associated with reading direction influenced foul judgments. Prior studies have shown that readers of left-to-right languages tend to think of prototypical events as unfolding concordantly, from left-to-right in space. It follows that events moving from right-to-left should be perceived as atypical and relatively debased. In an experiment using a go/no-go task and photographs taken from real games, participants made more foul calls for pictures depicting left-moving events compared to pictures depicting right-moving events. These data suggest that two referees watching the same play from distinct vantage points may be differentially predisposed to call a foul.

A sinister bias for calling fouls in soccer.

Three experiments with rats explored the differential outcome effect (DOE) using a pavlovian magazine approach conditioning preparation. Experiment 1 compared groups trained on a biconditional discrimination (AX+, AY-, BX-, BY+) with differential or nondifferential outcomes, and Experiment 2 examined this using an ambiguous occasion setting task (e.g., AX+, X-, Y+, AY-). In both experiments, subjects trained with differential outcomes learned the tasks better than subjects trained with nondifferential outcomes. Furthermore, subjects given differential outcome training learned the positive occasion setting component of the ambiguous task more efficiently than the negative occasion setting component, although both were enhanced by differential outcome training. Experiment 3 demonstrated that the ambiguous occasion setting task was reversed more readily when the target-outcome relations (as opposed to the modulator-outcome relations) were maintained during the reversal phase. These data suggest that an acquired distinctiveness effect may be responsible for the DOE in pavlovian learning.

Differential outcome effects in pavlovian biconditional and ambiguous occasion setting tasks.

Despite the ubiquity and importance of metaphor in thought and communication, its neural mediation remains elusive. We suggest that this uncertainty reflects, in part, stimuli that have not been designed with recent conceptual frameworks in mind or that have been hampered by inadvertent differences between metaphoric and literal conditions. In this article, we begin addressing these shortcomings by developing a large, flexible, extensively normed, and theoretically motivated set of metaphoric and literal sentences. On the basis of the results of three norming studies, we provide 280 pairs of closely matched metaphoric and literal sentences that are characterized along 10 dimensions: length, frequency, concreteness, familiarity, naturalness, imageability, figurativeness, interpretability, valence, and valence judgment reaction time. In addition to allowing for control of these potentially confounding lexical and sentential factors, these stimuli are designed to address questions about the role of novelty, metaphor type, and sensory-motor grounding in determining the neural basis of metaphor comprehension. Supplemental data for this article may be downloaded from http://brm.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.

Stimulus design is an obstacle course: 560 matched literal and metaphorical sentences for testing neural hypotheses about metaphor.

Is time an embodied concept? People often talk and think about temporal concepts in terms of space. This observation, along with linguistic and experimental behavioral data documenting a close conceptual relation between space and time, is often interpreted as evidence that temporal concepts are embodied. However, there is little neural data supporting the idea that our temporal concepts are grounded in sensorimotor representations. This lack of evidence may be because it is still unclear how an embodied concept of time should be expressed in the brain. The present paper sets out to characterize the kinds of evidence that would support or challenge embodied accounts of time. Of main interest are theoretical issues concerning (1) whether space, as a mediating concept for time, is itself best understood as embodied and (2) whether embodied theories should attempt to bypass space by investigating temporal conceptual grounding in neural systems that instantiate time perception.

Are temporal concepts embodied? A challenge for cognitive neuroscience.

Space, time, and causality provide a natural structure for organizing our experience. These abstract categories allow us to think relationally in the most basic sense; understanding simple events requires one to represent the spatial relations among objects, the relative durations of actions or movements, and the links between causes and effects. The present fMRI study investigates the extent to which the brain distinguishes between these fundamental conceptual domains. Participants performed a 1-back task with three conditions of interest (space, time, and causality). Each condition required comparing relations between events in a simple verbal narrative. Depending on the condition, participants were instructed to either attend to the spatial, temporal, or causal characteristics of events, but between participants each particular event relation appeared in all three conditions. Contrasts compared neural activity during each condition against the remaining two and revealed how thinking about events is deconstructed neurally. Space trials recruited neural areas traditionally associated with visuospatial processing, primarily bilateral frontal and occipitoparietal networks. Causality trials activated areas previously found to underlie causal thinking and thematic role assignment, such as left medial frontal and left middle temporal gyri, respectively. Causality trials also produced activations in SMA, caudate, and cerebellum; cortical and subcortical regions associated with the perception of time at different timescales. The time contrast, however, produced no significant effects. This pattern, indicating negative results for time trials but positive effects for causality trials in areas important for time perception, motivated additional overlap analyses to further probe relations between domains. The results of these analyses suggest a closer correspondence between time and causality than between time and space.

Deconstructing events: the neural bases for space, time, and causality.

Schemas are abstract nonverbal representations that parsimoniously depict spatial relations. Despite their ubiquitous use in maps and diagrams, little is known about their neural instantiation. We sought to determine the extent to which schematic representations are neurally distinguished from language on the one hand, and from rich perceptual representations on the other. In patients with either left hemisphere damage or right hemisphere damage, a battery of matching tasks depicting categorical spatial relations was used to probe for the comprehension of basic spatial concepts across distinct representational formats (words, pictures, and schemas). Left hemisphere patients underperformed right hemisphere patients across all tasks. However, focused residual analyses using voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping (VLSM) suggest that (1) left hemisphere deficits in the representation of categorical spatial relations are difficult to distinguish from deficits in naming these relations and (2) the right hemisphere plays a special role in extracting schematic representations from richly textured pictures.

Language, perception, and the schematic representation of spatial relations.

Metaphors are fundamental to creative thought and expression. Newly coined metaphors regularly infiltrate our collective vocabulary and gradually become familiar, but it is unclear how this shift from novel to conventionalized meaning happens in the brain. We investigated the neural career of metaphors in a functional magnetic resonance imaging study using extensively normed new metaphors and simulated the ordinary, gradual experience of metaphor conventionalization by manipulating participants' exposure to these metaphors. Results showed that the conventionalization of novel metaphors specifically tunes activity within bilateral inferior prefrontal cortex, left posterior middle temporal gyrus, and right postero-lateral occipital cortex. These results support theoretical accounts attributing a role for the right hemisphere in processing novel, low salience figurative meanings, but also show that conventionalization of metaphoric meaning is a bilaterally-mediated process. Metaphor conventionalization entails a decreased neural load within semantic networks rather than a hemispheric or regional shift across brain areas.

From novel to familiar: tuning the brain for metaphors.

Current research on analogy processing assumes that different conceptual relations are treated similarly. However, just as words and concepts are related in distinct ways, different kinds of analogies may employ distinct types of relationships. An important distinction in how words are related is the difference between associative (dog-bone) and categorical (dog-cat) relations. To test the hypothesis that analogical mapping of different types of relations would have different neural instantiations, we tested patients with left and right hemisphere lesions on their ability to understand two types of analogies, ones expressing an associative relationship and others expressing a categorical relationship. Voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping (VLSM) and behavioral analyses revealed that associative analogies relied on a large left-lateralized language network while categorical analogies relied on both left and right hemispheres. The verbal nature of the task could account for the left hemisphere findings. We argue that categorical relations additionally rely on the right hemisphere because they are more difficult, abstract, and fragile, and contain more distant relationships.

Not all analogies are created equal: Associative and categorical analogy processing following brain damage.

Maps, graphs, and diagrams use simplified graphic forms, like lines and blobs, to represent basic spatial relations, like boundaries and enclosures. A schema is an iconic representation where perceptual detail has been abstracted away from reality in order to provide a more flexible structure for cognition. Unlike truly symbolic representations of spatial relations (i.e., prepositions) a schema preserves some analog spatial qualities of the relation it stands in for. We tested the efficacy of schemas in facilitating the perception and comprehension of spatial relations in a patient with bilateral occipitoparietal damage and resulting simultanagnosia. Patient E.E. performed six matching tasks involving WORDS (in, on, above, below), photographic PICTURES of objects, and/or SCHEMAS depicting the same spatial relations. E.E. was instructed to match a single spatial relation to a corresponding image from an array of four choices. On the two tasks that did not include matching to or from schemas, E.E. performed at chance levels. On tasks with schemas, performance was significantly better, indicating that schematic representations make spatial relations visible in a manner that symbols and complex images do not. The results provide general insight as to how schemas facilitate spatial reasoning when used in graphic depictions, and how such theoretically intermediate representational structures could serve to link perceptual and verbal representations of spatial relations in the brain.

Schemas reveal spatial relations to a patient with simultanagnosia.

The ability to perceive causality is a central human ability constructed from elemental spatial and temporal information present in the environment. Although the nature of causality has captivated philosophers and scientists since antiquity, the neural correlates of causality remain poorly understood. In the present study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to generate hypotheses for candidate brain regions related to component processes important for perceptual causality in the human brain: elemental space perception, elemental time perception, and decision-making (Experiment 1; n=16). We then used transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to test neural hypotheses generated from the fMRI experiment (Experiment 2; n=16). In both experiments, participants judged causality in billiard-ball style launching events; a blue ball approaches and contacts a red ball. Spatial and temporal contributions to causal perception were assessed by parametrically varying the spatial linearity and the temporal delays of the movement of the balls. Experiment 1 demonstrated unique patterns of activation correlated with spatial, temporal, and decision-making components of causality perception. Using tDCS, we then tested hypotheses for the specific roles of the parietal and frontal cortices found in the fMRI experiment. Parietal stimulation only decreased participants' perception of causality based on spatial violations, while frontal stimulation made participants less likely to perceive causality based on violations of space and time. Converging results from fMRI and tDCS indicate that parietal cortices contribute to causal perception because of their specific role in processing spatial relations, while the frontal cortices contribute more generally, consistent with their role in decision-making.

Space, time, and causality in the human brain.

We investigate the effect of spatial categories on visual perception. In three experiments, participants made same/different judgments on pairs of simultaneously presented dot-cross configurations. For different trials, the position of the dot within each cross could differ with respect to either categorical spatial relations (the dots occupied different quadrants) or coordinate spatial relations (the dots occupied different positions within the same quadrant). The dot-cross configurations also varied in how readily the dot position could be lexicalized. In harder-to-name trials, crosses formed a "+" shape such that each quadrant was associated with two discrete lexicalized spatial categories (e.g., "above" and "left"). In easier-to-name trials, both crosses were rotated 45° to form an "×" shape such that quadrants were unambiguously associated with a single lexicalized spatial category (e.g., "above" or "left"). In Experiment 1, participants were more accurate when discriminating categorical information between easier-to-name categories and more accurate at discriminating coordinate spatial information within harder-to-name categories. Subsequent experiments attempted to down-regulate or up-regulate the involvement of language in task performance. Results from Experiment 2 (verbal interference) and Experiment 3 (verbal training) suggest that the observed spatial relation type-by-nameability interaction is resistant to online language manipulations previously shown to affect color and object-based perceptual processing. The results across all three experiments suggest that robust biases in the visual perception of spatial relations correlate with patterns of lexicalization, but do not appear to be modulated by language online.

Categorical biases in perceiving spatial relations.

Conceptual art made simple for neuroaesthetics.

In American football, pass interference calls can be difficult to make, especially when the timing of contact between players is ambiguous. American football history contains many examples of controversial pass interference decisions, often with fans, players, and officials interpreting the same event differently. The current study sought to evaluate the influence of experience with concepts important for officiating decisions in American football on the probability (i.e., response criteria) of pass interference calls. We further investigated the extent to which such experience modulates perceptual biases that might influence the interpretation of such events. We hypothesized that observers with less experience with the American football concepts important for pass interference would make progressively more pass interference calls than more experienced observers, even when given an explicit description of the necessary criteria for a pass interference call. In a go/no-go experiment using photographs from American football games, three groups of participants with different levels of experience with American football (Football Naïve, Football Player, and Football Official) made pass interference calls for pictures depicting left-moving and right-moving events. More experience was associated with progressively and significantly fewer pass interference calls [F (2,48) = 10.4, p < 0.001], with Football Naïve participants making the most pass interference calls, and Football Officials the least. In addition, our data replicated a prior finding of spatial biases for interpreting left-moving images more harshly than identical right-moving images, but only in Football Players. These data suggest that experience with the concepts important for making a decision may influence the rate of decision-making, and may also play a role in susceptibility to spatial biases.

Expertise and decision-making in American football.

When describing spatial events, dynamic actions can be decomposed into the path of motion (where the object moves), and the manner of motion (how the object moves). These components may be instantiated in two processing streams in the human brain, wherein dorsal parietal areas process path-related information, while ventral temporal regions process manner information. Previous research showed this pattern during the observation of videos showing animate characters in motion [15]. It is unknown whether reading language describing path and manner information - a level of abstraction beyond the perception of visual motion - relies on similar mechanisms. Here, we use functional neuroimaging to show that the left pMTG processes the manner of motion during reading. We also demonstrate the involvement of other ventral fronto-temporal regions in the understanding of manner of motion in spatial language.

Alexander Kranjec

Chronic Pain Research Consortium,
Department of Psychology

Duquesne University

A Protocol of Manual Tests to Measure Sensation and Pain in Humans

Alexander Kranjec

.css-o250i3{font-size:18px;font-family:Open Sans,sans-serif;line-height:21.6px;}Chronic Pain Research Consortium,Department of Psychology

Duquesne University

A Protocol of Manual Tests to Measure Sensation and Pain in Humans

Chronic Pain Research Consortium,
Department of Psychology